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ARGUMENT 
A&A challenge the trial court's determination, in the March 1,2010 Order, that A&A' s 
June 2000 release with Robena of claims relating to their services in support of the operation 
of the Robena plant was a complete release by A&A of their claims to payment from CoBon 
under the Consulting Agreement for the development of nine synfuel plant projects, only one 
of which was the development of what became the Robena plant (A&A's Claims).1 Two 
facts, unchallenged by CoBon, establish that the June 2000 Release was not a release of 
A&A's Claims under settled rules of controlling Pennsylvania law. First, when A&A gave 
that release, as "Viron," there was no dispute pending concerning CoBon's then completely 
inchoate (future) duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. Instead, the June 2000 
Release settled only a dispute concerning Robena's duty to pay Viron four months of a 
$15,000 monthly fee that had not been required under the Consulting Agreement, but under 
a completely separate contract. Second, CoBon did not repudiate its duty to pay A&A under 
the Consulting Agreement until over two years after Viron gave the release. 
A&A's Claims are for breach of CoBon's duty to pay under CoBon's and A&A's 
Consulting Agreement for A&A's services rendered to CoBon under that contract. Under 
the Consulting Agreement, A&A were to: (1) assist and support CoBon in finding and 
obtaining sites to build synfuel plants, coal feedstock sources for the plants and contracts for 
the sale of synfuel, all of which were part of the development of synfuel plants, and (2) assist 
CoBon in the sale of synfuel plants that were developed to companies looking to claim the 
1
 Capitalized terms have the same meaning as in A&A's Appellants' Brief. Citations 
to "Tab" and to the record are the same as in Appellants' Brief. 
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significant Section 29 tax credits that the plants could generate. (Tab C at §§ 1.0,1.2,1.3.) 
By the date of the June 2000 Release, A&A had assisted CoBon under the Consulting 
Agreement in the successful development of six synfuel plants (including the Robena plant). 
(Tabs AA, BB.) However, until September 2001, CoBon's duty to pay A&A for their 
services remained completely inchoate. CoBon had to pay for A&A's services only if and 
when CoBon received proceeds from synfuel facilities. A&A's fees under the Consulting 
Agreement were 30 percent of CoBon's actual proceeds over the course of the Section 29 tax 
credit program from synfuel facilities that were successfully developed and sold. (Tab C at 
§§2.0,2.4,3.0.) 
In May 2000, just before Viron executed the Robena release, CoBon actually paid 
advances to A&A under the Consulting Agreement based upon CoBon's "anticipated" 
receipt of proceeds from five of the synfuel plants. (Tabs W, X.) Not until September 2001 
did CoBon actually begin receiving distributable proceeds and, to date, CoBon has received 
at least $66,000,000 of such proceeds. (Tab Y at AA004282; 1810.) In November and 
December 2001, over a year after Viron gave its release to Robena, CoBon actually made 
payments to A&A based upon its actual receipt of proceeds that CoBon expressly recognized 
were "distributable" to A&A under the Consulting Agreement. {Id.) However, in November 
2002, over two years after Viron gave the Robena release, CoBon completely repudiated its 
duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement on a going-forward basis, based upon 
some unspecified alleged change in the tax laws. (Tab Z.) CoBon, at that time, did not even 
hint that the Robena release had discharged its duty to pay A&A. {Id.) CoBon's repudiation 
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prompted A&A to first assert claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement. 
Rather than settle a dispute concerning CoBon's then-inchoate duty to pay A&A under 
the Consulting Agreement, the June 2000 Release settled only a dispute concerning Robena's 
duty to pay Viron $15,000 per month for services performed for the then-operating Robena 
plant (A&A were called "Viron" in connection with the $15,000 per month services to 
Robena). (Tab B.) Events leading to the June 2000 Release started in March 1998, when 
A&A, as Viron, offered to assist in the operation of the Robena plant for a monthly fee not 
due under the Consulting Agreement (because the proposed operational services to Robena 
were not for the development or sale of the plant). (Tabs F, AA at ^103-105).) The 
proposed services primarily were assisting Robena in obtaining short-term feedstock for the 
Robena plant' s operation pending completion of the wash facility that would enable the plant 
to optimally use the long-term feedstock source that A&A had assisted CoBon in obtaining 
as part of the plant's development. (Id.) In April-May 1998, CoBon disputed Viron's 
entitlement to the monthly fee. (Tabs G-K.) CoBon took and initially reserved the position 
that Viron's assistance in obtaining short-term feedstock was required as part of A&A's 
development services under the Consulting Agreement. (Id.) Nevertheless, Robena 
separately agreed, in the July 1, 1998 agreement, to pay Viron a $15,000 monthly fee for 
short-term feedstock services. (Tab D.) This was after CoBon had sold Robena to Providian, 
which had acquired Robena in order to be able to claim the anticipated Section 29 tax credits. 
(Tab AA at [^114, 6548 at Exs. 386, 470.) 
As repeatedly and expressly acknowledged by CoBon, Viron fully performed for 
3 
Robena not only the short-term feedstock services Robena originally contracted for, but also 
extensive management services that CoBon never claimed to be due under its Consulting 
Agreement with A&A. CoBon, for example, after Palmer became the manager of Robena, 
represented to Palmer as follows: 
[Viron's short-term feedstock] services was later refined to also include 
interceding and assisting as required to resolve union labor issues, assisting with 
permit compliance and obtaining new permits as required for operation of the 
wash plant, assisting with [the IRS private letter ruling] issues, meeting with 
operations personnel to identify and address operations problems, and arranging 
for all raw material coal fines and final product coal pellet testing.... [CoBon] 
understood that Palmer would continue to utilize Viron in this capacity after it 
assumed management responsibilities. 
(Tab U at 4.) This, of course, was far beyond anything required of A&A in the Consulting 
Agreement to develop a plant to the point it could be sold and operated. (Tab C at §1.2.) 
However, in May 1999, Robena stopped paying its outside vendors, including Viron, 
and, on July 1, 1999, Providian replaced CoBon with Palmer as the manager of Robena. 
(Tabs M, AA at ffifl 17, 123; 6548 at Ex. 736).) By that time, and onward, CoBon was a 
staunch proponent of Viron getting paid by Robena, stating Viron was performing valuable 
services in support of the operation of the Robena plant. (6548 at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; 
Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.) Robena, however, continued not to pay. (Id.) 
By September 1, 1999, when Viron provided notice of termination of its services, 
Robena owed Viron $60,000 - the last four months of the $ 15,000 monthly fee. (6548 at Ex. 
763; Tabs P, AA at Tf 127.) Viron then sued Robena, not CoBon, in the Pennsylvania action 
for just payment of the $60,000. (Tab S.) It was just this dispute that was settled by the June 
2000 Release. (Tab B.) This claim did not arise under the Consulting Agreement, as that 
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contract had not provided for A&A to get paid a $ 15,000 monthly fee. (Tab C.) Instead, the 
dispute concerned Robena's duty, created by only the separate July 1,1998 agreement, to pay 
Viron that fee. (Tab D.) During the pendency of Viron's Pennsylvania action and its 
settlement with the June 2000 Release, there was not even the suggestion of a dispute 
concerning CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab AA at ff 129, 
135, 144.) CoBon had not challenged A&A's then-inchoate, future right to be paid under 
the Consulting Agreement. (Id.) CoBon had not repudiated its then-inchoate, future duty to 
pay A&A once it received proceeds from the six fully developed plants. (Id.) Indeed, while 
Viron's Pennsylvania action was pending, CoBon paid A&A advances based upon 
CoBon's "anticipated" receipt of distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. 
(Tabs W, X, AA at TJ144.) In light of the absence of any dispute concerning CoBon's duty 
to pay when Viron gave the Robena release, and given the release's lack of mention of any 
claims under the Consulting Agreement, the release could not bar A&A's claims to payment 
under the Consulting Agreement under Pennsylvania law. 
Only late in Appellees' Brief (at pages 34-48) does CoBon finally present its argument 
and interpretation of the June 2000 Release as a release of A&A's Claims to payment under 
the Consulting Agreement, which indisputedly had been inchoate at the time Viron gave the 
release. CoBon's argument rests upon its theory that, because Viron mistakenly had alleged 
in its Pennsylvania complaint against Robena that its contract with Robena was the May 8, 
1998 letter (in which CoBon had protested Viron getting paid the $15,000 monthly fee), 
Viron's Pennsylvania action against Robena allegedly was against CoBon and somehow 
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involved CoBon's and A&A's April-May 1998 dispute as to whether A&A were entitled to 
the $15,000 monthly fee. According to CoBon, because the April-May 1998 dispute had 
concerned whether Viron's short-term feedstock services to Robena had been due under the 
Consulting Agreement, the June 2000 Release somehow settled all possible disputes under 
the Consulting Agreement. 
CoBon's interpretation and theory are neither legally nor factually credible. CoBon 
fails to acknowledge the settled rules of Pennsylvania law regarding the application of 
releases that determine this appeal. CoBon's theory is no answer to the fact that the June 
2000 Release did not expressly state it covered potential claims arising after it was executed, 
as necessary under Pennsylvania law for it to have been a release of future A&A's Claims. 
CoBon ignores that CoBon's and A&A's April-May 1998 dispute concerned only Viron's 
entitlement to be paid $15,000 per month by Robena. CoBon had merely objected to Viron 
getting paid $15,000 by Robena for short-term feedstock services that CoBon claimed 
already were due under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs F-K) CoBon does not contend the 
dispute was broader in scope and this was all the trial court found to be the subject of the 
April-May 1998 dispute. (Tab A at Findings 1fl[3-4.) The April-May 1998 dispute did not 
concern A&A" s right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon had not challenged 
in any manner A&A's then-inchoate right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement. That 
dispute could not have given rise to a claim by CoBon in the Pennsylvania action that A&A 
had breached the Consulting Agreement under CoBon's April-May 1998 position that 
Viron's short-term feedstock services were required under that contract. Indeed, CoBon 
6 
repeatedly acknowledged that Viron had fully performed not only those short-term feedstock 
services, but also the additional services to the operation of the Robena plant that CoBon 
never claimed were required under the Consulting Agreement (e.g., assisting in labor 
disputes, permitting and day-to-day operational issues). 
As such, even under CoBon's theory that Viron's Pennsylvania action had involved the 
April-May 1998 dispute, that action still would have involved only Robena's duty to pay 
Viron the $15,000 monthly fee, and not CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting 
Agreement. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the June 2000 Release still could not have been 
a release by A&A of claims for payment by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. 
I. The Fact That The June 2000 Release Did Not Expressly State It Covered Claims 
Accruing After Its Execution Meant It Did Not Cover A&A's Claims Under The 
Consulting Agreement, Which Accrued After Viron Gave The Release 
CoBon ignores the "cardinal rule of construction requiring that releases be strictly 
construed so as to not bar the enforcement of claims not yet accrued at the date of 
execution." Vaughn v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added); 
see also Henry Shenk Co. v. City of Erie, 43 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 1945) (stating same rule); In 
re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1940) (same); Zurich Gen. Ace. andLiab. Ins. Co. v. 
Klein, 121 A.2d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (same).2 
This "cardinal rule" means a release may potentially bar inchoate claims only by 
actually expressly stating it covers claims that may arise in the future, and not upon 
interpretation of the release's general language. See Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d 199,201 
2
 CoBon concedes the release settled a Pennsylvania lawsuit and, by its express terms, 
is to be interpreted under Pennsylvania law. (Tab B at ^8.) 
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(Pa. 1967) ("[T]he general words of the release will not be construed so as to bar the 
enforcement of a claim which has not accrued at the date of the release."); In re Brill's 
Estate, 12 A.2d 50 at 52 (stating same rule). 
Several appellate decisions applying Pennsylvania law demonstrate the kind of language 
that must be present for a release to potentially bar claims accruing after execution of the 
release. See Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 39 (all claims "the undersigned now has or hereafter may 
have"); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 895 (3rd Cir. 1975) (all 
claims the releasors "ever had, now have or which they or any of them hereafter can, shall 
or may have"); Bickings v. Bethlehem Lukens Plate, 82 F. Supp.2d 402,406 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(all claims "whether known or unknown... that [releasor] ever had, now have or may have 
or claim to have in the future").3 
This "cardinal rule" is dispositive of this appeal regardless of the intended subject 
matter scope of the June 2000 Release. The June 2000 Release did not expressly state it 
covered potential claims that may accrue subsequent to Viron giving the release; it used no 
language similar to that found in the releases at issue in Vaughn, Three Rivers Motors and 
Bickings. To the contrary, Viron and Robena expressly stated in the June 2000 Release that 
they released each other and the "Released Parties" only from: 
any and all claims, counterclaims . . . which relate to or arise out of any consulting 
services which have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic 
Fuel Plant (the "Project") including, without limitation, claims asserted in, or that 
could have been asserted in, [Viron's Pennsylvania action]. 
3
 CoBon misstates Three Rivers Motors as an example of a release covered possible 
future claims without expressly stating the release covers possible future claims. (Aplee. Br. 
atn.31.) 
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(TabB at 1131-30.) 
The release9 s lack of language expressly stating it covered potential claims arising after 
its execution is fatal to CoBon's allegation that the June 2000 Release bars A&A's Claims 
for payment under the Consulting Agreement. Those claims did not accrue until, at the 
earliest, November 2002, over two years after Viron entered into the June 2000 Release. 
This is when CoBon first repudiated its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. 
(Tab Z.) Without the required language, it would be "unreasonable in fact as it would be 
unwarranted law" to hold that Viron's June 2000 release of claims to payment for its services 
to Robena was intended to constitute a release of claims to payment for different services 
under a different contract with a different party arising almost two and a half years after 
Viron gave the release. See Henry Shenk, 43 A.2d at 102; Klein, 121 A.2d at 894-96. 
CoBon argues the release bars claims "regardless of when such claims... might be said 
to accrue" because (1) the release phrases "any and all" and "relating to or arising out o f are 
comprehensive and allegedly "forward-looking," (2) the release's subject matter clause 
("consulting services which have been performed by Viron . . .") is stated in the past tense, 
and (3) the release's inclusion clause mentions claims that "could have been" brought in the 
Pennsylvania action. (Aplee. Br. at 44.) CoBon also relies upon the fact that the release 
"does not limit the time within which a claim must be filed" and argues that, "as in virtually 
all releases, the language expressly and impliedly anticipates the discharge of claims that 
might be asserted in the future." (Id. at 45 (emphasis in original).) 
CoBon plainly argues that the general language of the release covers claims regardless 
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of when they come into existence, rather than cite any language expressly stating that future 
claims then unknown were covered (i.e., language such as used in the releases at issue in 
Vaughn, Three Rivers Motors and Bickings). CoBon's interpretation is clearly prohibited by 
the Pennsylvania "cardinal rule" of strict construction. 
Moreover, even were such an interpretation permitted, CoBon's interpretation is not 
legally valid because the June 2000 Release did not use "forward-looking" language to state 
the scope of claims being released. The release phrases "any and all" and "which relate to 
or arise out o f are not "forward-looking" phrases. As a matter of law, they are references 
only to existing claims. See, e.g., In re Brill 9s Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (viewing the similar 
phrase "any and all manner of actions" to mean "a general settlement of all accounts up to 
that time . . . . " ) . The fact that the subject matter clause is stated in the past tense confirms 
Robena's and Viron's intent to limit the release to only their existing claims. This also is 
confirmed by the reference in the inclusion clause to claims that could have been asserted in 
Viron's Pennsylvania action. The Pennsylvania action could not have involved claims that 
did not exist when it was pending. 
CoBon's bare proposition that a release must be interpreted as covering future claims 
unless the parties expressly limit the release to existing claims is directly contrary to the 
Pennsylvania "cardinal rule" of strict construction, which provides a release can cover future 
possible claims only by expressly stating it covers future possible claims. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its interpretation, CoBon also argues that 
A&A's Claims to payment by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement already had accrued 
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by the time Viron entered into the June 2000 Release on June 28,2000. CoBon makes two 
alternative arguments as to how A&A's Claims allegedly accrued before that date. 
First, CoBon argues that the rule is that a claim for payment for services accrues when 
the services are rendered, rather when the duty to pay is breached. CoBon plainly is wrong; 
a claim for payment cannot accrue before the claimant's right to be paid ripens.4 Packer 
Society Hill Travel Agency, Inc. v. Presbyterian Univ. ofPenn. Med. Ctr., 635 A.2d 649,652 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("In general, an action based on contract accrues at the time of 
breach."). Instead, a claim for breach of a duty to pay for services accrues only when the 
party having that duty breaches or repudiates it. See, e.g., id.; Total Control Inc. v. Danaher 
Corp., 359 F. Supp.2d 387, 393-94 (E.D. Pa. 2005).5 In case of an anticipatory repudiation, 
if the non-breaching party elects to treat the other party' s performance as completely due, the 
claim for payment accrues at the time of election. Total Control, 359 F. Supp.2d at 393-94. 
As of the date of the Robena release (June 28,2000), CoBon's duty to pay for A&A's 
services under the Consulting Agreement was completely inchoate; CoBon had yet to receive 
any distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab C at §§ 2.1,2.2; Tab Y.) 
4
 CoBon's two cases on this point, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. v. 
Energypro Constr. Partners, 271 A.D.2d 233,234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), and International 
Potato Corp. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 602,604 (Ct. CI. 1958), are inapposite. Parsons 
states the rule for when a design/construction project owner's claim for breach against a 
professional service provider accrues, not when the service provider's claim for payment 
accrues. International Potato merely stated a rule for accrual of a claim for payment upon 
a sale of goods, where payment was due upon delivery of the goods. 
5
 CoBon's attempt to distinguish Total Control because it was a statute of limitations 
case is baffling. The rule for accrual of claims is not different in statute of limitation cases 
than other cases; a contract claim accrues upon the breach. 
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As such, A&A's claims to payment could have accrued by June 28,2000 only if CoBon had 
anticipatorily repudiated its duty to pay A&A before that date. That never happened. At the 
time Viron executed the release, there was not even the suggestion of a dispute regarding 
CoBon's inchoate duty to pay A&A in the future. 
Alternatively, CoBon argues that A&A's Claims already had accrued by June 28,2000 
because Viron's Pennsylvania action against Robena allegedly involved CoBon's and A&A's 
April-May 1998 dispute. Thus, according to CoBon, the Pennsylvania action was under the 
Consulting Agreement such that all possible claims by A&A under the Consulting 
Agreement had accrued and could have been presented in the Pennsylvania action. 
There are two fatal flaws with this argument. First, as a matter of law, the accrual of 
one claim under a contract does not result in the accrual of all potential claims under the 
contract. This is demonstrated by the many release cases holding that a single claim, but not 
other claims under the same contract, were released. See, e.g., Cady v. Mitchell, 220 A.2d 
373,374-75 (Pa. Super. 1966); Cockeroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 A. 687,689 (Pa. 
Super. 1937). Second, in April-May 1998, CoBon had not challenged in any manner, much 
less repudiated, A&A's then-inchoate right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement. 
(Tabs F-K.) Thus, even if the Pennsylvania action had involved the April-May 1998 dispute, 
A&A's Claims still would not have accrued as of the time of the release. 
IL The Fact That, At The Time Viron Entered Into The June 2000 Release, There 
Was No Dispute Between A&A And CoBon Regarding CoBon's Duty To Pay 
A&A Under The Consulting Agreement Demonstrates The Error Of The March 
1, 2010 Order Regardless Of The Language Used In The Release 
CoBon ignores the rule under Pennsylvania law that, before a release can be found to 
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bar a particular claim, not only must the release language expressly provide it covers such 
a claim, but the circumstances must demonstrate that the parties specifically had the 
particular claim in mind and bargained for its release. "'It is a settled rule of construction 
that an agreement comprehends only those things in respect to which it appears the 
contracting parties proposed to contract, and not others they never thought of . . . The 
release cannot be allowed to embrace anything beyond it. A release ordinarily covers only 
such matters as may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when 
it was given." Cockcroft, 189 A. at 689 (citations omitted); see also Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40 
("'The courts of Pennsylvania have traditionally determined the effect of a release using the 
ordinary meaning of its language and interpreted the release as covering "only such matters 
as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the release 
was given."'" (citation omitted, emphasis in original)); Restifo, 230 A.2d at 201 (stating same 
rule has been recognized by "[a] long line of Pennsylvania cases"); Cady, 220 A.2d at 374 
(stating same rule); Klein, \2\ A.2d at 896 (stating same rule). 
"The surrounding circumstances clarify the intention of the parties and identify 'matters 
which may be fairly said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the 
release was given.'"6 Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 406 (quoting Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40.) As 
held in Restifo, the circumstances "must show that a release [of the claim] was bargained for 
and within the parties' contemplation." 230 A.2d at 202. 
Under this rule, even a release that expressly states it bars all existing claims does not 
6
 CoBon miscites the "within the contemplation of the parties" rule as concerning the 
language of the release, when it actually concerns the circumstances of the release. 
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bar a particular existing claim that the circumstances demonstrate was not within the 
contemplation of the parties.7 See, e.g., Cady, 220 A.2d at 374-75 (holding that husband's 
and wife's release of insurer "of any damage, loss or injury, which heretofore have been or 
which hereafter may be sustained by us in consequence of [a car accident]" did not bar the 
wife's injury claim from the same accident because the circumstances showed that the parties 
had not contemplated a release of the wife's claim). Likewise, even a release that expressly 
states it bars claims arising in the future does not bar a particular claim arising subsequent 
to the release that the circumstances demonstrate was not within the contemplation of the 
parties. See, e.g., Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40 (holding that an express release of all persons of 
all known and unknown claims, including potential future claims, arising from a car accident 
did not bar a claim that subsequently arose for medical malpractice resulting from treatment 
of injuries from the accident because the circumstances showed that the parties had not 
contemplated that claim). Facts that have been held to show a claim was not within the 
contemplation of the parties include: (1) the claim had not accrued when the release was 
given, (2) the only consideration for the release was an amount covering a separate 
injury, (3) lack of knowledge of the claim when the release was given, and (4) lack of 
discussion regarding the claim or the potential for the claim during the negotiation or closing 
of the release. See, e.g., Cady, 220 A.2d at 375; Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40-41. 
7
 The exception is where the parties manifest an intent to settle all accounts, when the 
release will be given effect even as to unknown claims that existed when the release was 
given. See Three Rivers Motors, 522 F.2d at 896. This exception is not applicable here, as 
the June 2000 Release did not expressly state it was a settlement of all accounts, including 
unknown claims, and because A&A's Claims did not exist when Viron gave the release. 
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Here, the circumstances conclusively demonstrate that, when they gave their mutual 
release, Viron and Robena did not contemplate A&A's release of claims to payment under 
the Consulting Agreement. A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement had 
not yet accrued when Viron gave their release. CoBon's duty to pay had not yet become due 
and CoBon had not anticipatorily repudiated that duty. (Tabs C at ffl[2.0, 2.4, 3.0, Y at 
AA004285, Z.) At that time, there was not even the suggestion of a pending dispute 
concerning CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement if and when CoBon 
received distributable proceeds; CoBon had not in any manner challenged A&A's right to 
be paid and A&A had not made a demand to be paid. (Tab AA at Tft[135, 141-44.) Instead, 
when Viron gave the release, A&A had every reason to believe they would be paid under the 
Consulting Agreement once CoBon started receiving distributable proceeds, because CoBon 
had just paid A&A advances, in May 2000, based upon its "anticipated" receipt of 
distributable proceeds. (Tabs W, X.) A&A plainly did not even anticipate, at that time, they 
might have to make a claim for payment under the Consulting Agreement for their 3 0 percent 
of the proceeds CoBon may receive in the future. (Tab AAatfl44.) When the June 2000 
Release was negotiated and closed, there was no discussion regarding the Consulting 
Agreement. (Tab AA at ffi[135, 141-44; 6548 at Exs. 736, 843, 845, 846.) In fact, Viron 
negotiated the release only with Palmer, Robena's manager, who had no authority to even 
negotiate a release of A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement.8 (Id.) 
8
 In response to this fact, CoBon merely points out that it had some communications 
with Palmer regarding the wording of the June 2000 Release, and that it signed the June 2000 
Release for Robena. (Aplee. Br. at 33-34.) However, CoBon's communications with 
(continued...) 
15 
Another fact to which the Pennsylvania courts look is whether the only consideration 
for the release was an amount for a separate injury. Here Viron's consideration for their 
release was limited to precisely the amount they claimed they were owed by Robena 
under the separate contract. (Tab B at 1131, Tab S at Prayer.) There was not one dollar 
more for any release of their claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement. The 
amount owed A&A under the Consulting Agreement is at least $22 million dollars. 
Although that amount in June 2000 was still contingent upon CoBon receiving proceeds from 
the six synftiel plants that had been developed by that date, the law expects some amount of 
money should have been paid for A&A to release any claim to these payments over and 
above the $60,000 owed for their operational services to Robena under a separate contract. 
Instead the facts show A&A (as Viron) sued only for the $60,000 owed under the separate 
Robena operating services contract and the settlement amount was precisely that number. 
There is absolutely no basis to conclude that Viron and Robena in fact had contemplated 
A&A's release of claims to future possible payment of millions of dollars under the 
Consulting Agreement was covered by the June 2000 Release. 
Even under CoBon's theory that the Pennsylvania action involved the April - May 1998 
dispute as to whether the Consulting Agreement covered the services for what Viron was 
seeking "an additional" $15,000 per month, that dispute still would have been limited to 
Robena's duty to pay Viron the $ 15,000 monthly fees, rather than CoBon's duty to pay A&A 
8(...continued) 
Robena were not communications with Viron. CoBon's signature merely reflected that it 
remained the general partner, not that CoBon owned or controlled Robena. 
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thirty percent of its proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs F-K.) CoBon could 
not have claimed in the Pennsylvania action that A&A had breached the Consulting 
Agreement under CoBon's April-May 1998 position that Viron's short-term feedstock 
services to Robena were required under the Consulting Agreement. As CoBon recognized, 
Viron (A&A) had fully performed for Robena not only those services but also a wide-range 
of additional management services that CoBon has never claimed were due under the 
Consulting Agreement. (Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.) 
Under the Pennsylvania rule that a release covers only such matters within the 
contemplation of the parties, even a showing that Viron and Robena had contemplated 
settling the issue of whether Viron's services to Robena were required under the Consulting 
Agreement would not be a showing that they had contemplated settling the separate, unraised 
issue of whether CoBon had to pay A&A thirty percent of its proceeds from all six developed 
plants if and when CoBon began receiving those proceeds. See Cady, 220 A.2d at 374-75; 
Cocker oft, 189 A. at 689; Wenger v. Ziegler, 226 A.2d 653,655 (Pa. 1967) (observing "those 
cases which allow the maintenance of a suit for property damage following the settlement 
of a prior claim for personal injuries sustained in the same accident where the written release 
expressly precludes only a subsequent personal injury claim."). 
This is amply demonstrated by the Pennsylvania decisions in Cady, discussed above, 
and Cocker oft. In Cocker oft, the plaintiff had two claims against the defendant insurer under 
one life insurance policy, one for a natural death payment and the other for a double 
indemnity payment for accidental death. 189 A. at 689. The plaintiff had accepted a check 
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from the insurer as payment of the natural death claim that stated it was "in full payment of 
all claims." Id. The issue was whether the plaintiff had thereby released her double 
indemnity claim, which the court stated "depends upon the facts and circumstances existing 
at the time of the release." Id. The court held that the double indemnity claim had not been 
released because the plaintiff had not made a demand for double indemnity and did not have 
knowledge of the claim for double indemnity when the release was given. Id. 
Moreover, the evidence disproves CoBon's theory that Viron' s Pennsylvania action was 
against CoBon and involved a dispute under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon asserts that 
it owned and controlled Robena when Viron sued Robena, but offers no support for this 
assertion, which is clearly contrary to the record. (Tab AA at %\ 14; 6548 at Exs. 386,470.) 
The Pennsylvania action was against Robena, not CoBon, and was only for recovery of four 
months of the $15,000 fee. (Tab S.) The contractual duty to pay Viron the $15,000 monthly 
fee was not created by the Consulting Agreement. (Tab C.) That duty was Robena's, not 
CoBon's, under only the July 1, 1998 agreement. (TabD.) Neither the May 8,1998northe 
May 18,-19 1998 letters obligated CoBon to pay Viron $15,000 per month.9 (Tabs H, K.) 
It was Robena's, not CoBon's, failure to pay Viron the last four months of the $15,000 fee 
that prompted Viron to file the Pennsylvania action. (Tab R.) CoBon clearly was at odds 
with Robena's non-payment of the last four months of Viron's $ 15,000 per month fee. (6548 
9
 CoBon asserts that, under the May 8 and 18-19, 1998 letters, it "assumed" and 
"guaranteed" Robena's duty to pay Viron the $15,000 monthly fee. (Aplee Br. at n.38.) 
However, neither letter provided that CoBon either assumed or guaranteed Robena's duty to 
pay Viron that fee. (Tabs H, K.) CoBon's sole obligation under those letters - to see that 
Robena separately contracted with Viron to pay the fee - was discharged when Robena 
separately contracted to retain Viron. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235(1). 
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at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.) CoBon did not appear in the Pennsylvania 
action and stated Robena's lawyers for that action did not represent CoBon. (Tab U.) 
Robena never asserted the defense that it did not have to pay the $15,000 monthly fee 
because Viron's services had been required under the Consulting Agreement; this issue was 
never raised nor litigated. (Tab AA at ffl[142-143.) CoBon does not challenge these facts. 
Finally, other than essentially arguing that this Court should ignore the payments, 
CoBon does not challenge that it made six separate payments to A&A totaling $438,000 for 
A&A's share of CoBon's proceeds under the Consulting Agreement subsequent to Viron 
entering into the June 2000 Release. (Tabs Y at AA004282, Z, BB at f!9; 27; 6548 at Ex. 
1008.) Nor does CoBon challenge that it never relied upon Viron's release as a basis for 
avoiding its duty to pay A&A until long after it had filed this lawsuit. Under Pennsylvania 
law, these actions by CoBon, which were directly contrary to its belated allegation that A&A 
had released their claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement, are "the strongest 
indication" of the lack of merit of CoBon's allegation. See Sun Co., Inc. v. Penn. Turnpike 
Comm., 708 A.2d 875, 880 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1998) (parties' conduct after entering into a 
contract observed "may be the strongest indication of the [parties'] intention"). 
III. Even If The Fact That The June 2000 Release Did Not Expressly State It Covered 
Possible Claims Accruing After It Was Executed And The Circumstances, Both 
Before And After The Release Was Executed, Are Ignored, The Release's Subject 
Matter Scope Could Not Be Interpreted To Cover A&A's Claims In This Lawsuit 
CoBon ignores the Pennsylvania rule that releases cannot be interpreted to be broader 
in scope than the scope expressly stated in the release. The oft-quoted statement of the rule 
in Pennsylvania case law is that "words used in a release should not be construed to extend 
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beyond the express consideration mentioned or to operate as a release of indebtedness the 
parties apparently did not intend." Flaccus v. Wood, 103 A. 549, 551 (Pa. 1918); see also 
Crockroft, 189 A. at 689 (quoting same rule); In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (quoting 
same rule); Cady, 220 A.2d at 374 (quoting same rule). This rule is overcome only by 
express language in a release. See Flaccus, 103 A. at 551 ("This [rule against interpretation 
to cover claims apparently not intended] however, is a rule of construction and can have no 
application where, as in the present case, the very language used by the parties excludes its 
use."); In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (same). This is what is meant by the fact that the 
rule is only a rule of interpretation that can be overcome by express language in the release. 
See Stornawaye Properties, Inc. v. Moses, 76 F. Supp.2d 607, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating 
that the fact this is a rule of interpretation means "if the language and intent indicate that 
even unaccrued or unknown claims are to be released, that intent will be enforced."). 
Under this rule, a release bars claims only by express inclusion - the release must 
expressly state a particular subject matter in order to bar claims relating to that subject matter 
- and release by implication, inference or failure to expressly exclude claims is prohibited. 
See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 906 A.2d 586,596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding 
the release did not cover an insured's claim against his insurer as "there is no language which 
explicitly releases [the insurer] from its contractual duties to [the insured].");Wenger, 226 
A.2d at 654-55 ("It is inconceivable to us that a release otherwise silent may be construed so 
as to deprive only one party of rights arising from a given transaction.") 
Under this rule, the language of the June 2000 Release did not cover A&A's claims to 
payment under the Consulting Agreement because it did not mention CoBon, the Consulting 
Agreement or A&A's services to CoBon in stating the scope of its subject matter. Instead, 
the expressly stated scope of the June 2000 Release was "any and all claims . . . which relate 
to or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding the 
Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." (Tab B at 1130 (emphasis added).) This expressed subject 
matter - uany consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena 
Synthetic Fuel Plant" - is an exact description of Viron's services to Robena for which 
it was to be paid $15,000 per month. This language refers to Viron's services to Robena 
because only Viron and Robena were releasing claims. As such, under the Pennsylvania rule 
set forth above, the release cannot be interpreted to cover A&A's Claims for payment of a 
percentage of CoBon's proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. Those claims related to 
A&A's services to CoBon regarding the development and sale of numerous actual and 
potential synfuel plants, and not Viron's services to assist in the operation of just the Robena 
plant. The release mentions no other synfuel plants or other services, so, as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law, the release cannot be interpreted as a potential release of claims relating 
to services other than Viron's services regarding the operation of the Robena plant. 
This limited scope of the release is confirmed by other language in the release: (1) it 
expressly mentioned only a dispute between Viron and Robena, which necessarily concerned 
only Viron's services to Robena and not A&A's services to CoBon since Robena was not a 
party to the Consulting Agreement; (2) the release stated it was mutual in scope between 
Viron and Robena, which meant the release had to be limited to claims relating to Viron's 
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services to Robena since only those services could have given rise to a mutual release 
between Viron and Robena; and (3) Viron's consideration for their release was the exact 
amount, $60,000 that Robena owed Viron for their services to Robena, which was not in any 
way related to the amount owed by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon has no 
answer to this language.10 
CoBon's criticism of A&A's interpretation of the scope of the release is without merit. 
CoBon's theme that the June 2000 Release must be interpreted broadly to be unlimited 
because it does not expressly exclude claims is directly contrary to the Pennsylvania rule that 
releases are not to be construed broadly but are to be limited to their expressed scope.11 
CoBon argues that the expressed subject matter "any consulting services which have 
been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the 'Project')" was a 
reference to A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement because (1) A&A 
assisted CoBon under the Consulting Agreement regarding the project to develop the Robena 
plant, (2) this language referred to the Robena plant as a "Project" and made no distinction 
between development and operations services, and (3) Viron's services to Robena allegedly 
10
 CoBon's only response is that A&A did not rely upon this language before the trial 
court. Not only is this wrong (3391 at pp. 9-10,30), but irrelevant. This is a de novo review; 
A&A preserved all possible appeal arguments by challenging below CoBon's allegation that 
the June 2000 Release was a release of A&A's Claims. 
11
 CoBon's reliance upon Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UTApp 69,^20, 
180 P.3d 765, is misplaced. Labrum applies Utah, not Pennsylvania, law. Moreover, it 
merely stands for the proposition that an expressly stated broad scope of release - one which 
expressly states it covers all claims between the releasing parties - should be applied to all 
claims between the parties. This proposition has no application here. The release did not 
expressly state it covered all claims between Viron and Robena, much less all claims between 
A&A and CoBon. 
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had been required under the Consulting Agreement. However, contrary to Pennsylvania law, 
CoBon wants the release to be applied to a subject matter not expressed in the release. The 
release's mention of only services regarding just one plant cannot be interpreted, under 
Pennsylvania law, to cover A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement 
because those services were for the development and sale of multiple potential and actual 
synfuel plants. See Flaccus, 103 A. at 551; In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52; 
Commonwealth, Dep'tofTransp. v. Bracken Constr. Co., 457 A.2d995,999 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 
1983) ("The maxim expressio unius exclusion alterius provides that the mention of certain 
items implies the purposeful exclusion of other items of the same general character."). 
Moreover, the Robena plant had been operating for two years by the time Viron entering into 
the June 2000 Release. Thus, the reference to the "Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" necessarily 
was to the existing, operating plant, rather than the project to develop and sell the plant. 
Regardless of CoBon's April-May 1998 position that Viron's short-term feedstock 
services to Robena were due under the Consulting Agreement, the facts remain that Robena 
separately contracted for those services, Viron went on to provide to Robena extensive 
services that CoBon never claimed were required under the Consulting Agreement, and 
Robena negotiated for Viron's continued services as part of the negotiation of the June 2000 
Release. (Tabs D, U; 6548 at Exs. 843, 845, 846.) As such, for purposes of determining the 
intended scope of the release, the short-term feedstock services in fact had been carved out 
from the Consulting Agreement, and Viron and Robena in fact considered Viron's services 
to Robena to be separate from A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. 
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(Id.) As such, the language "any consulting services which have been performed by Viron 
regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" must have been a reference to only Viron's 
consulting services to Robena. 
CoBon argues that A&A' s interpretation allegedly renders the release phrase "that relate 
to or arise out o f meaningless, and that this phrase allegedly "expands" the subject matter 
scope of the release and must be interpreted broadly. However, A&A properly interpret that 
phrase to mean a claim must relate to "any consulting services which have been performed 
by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" - the expressed subject matter - in 
order to have been released. See, e.g., Central States Foundation v. Balka, 590 N. W.2d 832, 
837 (Neb. 1999). Contrary to CoBon's argument, the "relate to or arise out o f phrase does 
not state the release's subject matter, and thus does not add claims to the intended release 
beyond the claims relating to Viron's services "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." 
CoBon also argues that A&A's interpretation allegedly renders meaningless the 
inclusion clause "including, without limitation, claims asserted in, or that could have been 
asserted in, [Viron's Pennsylvania action]." CoBon argues this clause also allegedly adds 
to the subject matter scope of the release. However, the inclusion clause did not mention 
CoBon, the Consulting Agreement or any services, much less any services in addition to 
those mentioned in the separate subject matter clause. Under Pennsylvania law, the inclusion 
clause cannot be interpreted to expand the scope of the release beyond claims relating to 
Viron's services to Robena; it merely served to illustrate particular claims that are within the 
intended scope of the release. See, e.g., Schneider, 906 A.2d at 596; see also Field v. Boyer 
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Co,, L.C, 952 P.2d 1078,1086-87 (Utah 1998) (applying the rule ofexpressio unus, exclusio 
alterius to a statutory inclusion clause). 
Moreover, Viron (A&A) did not claim, and could not have claimed, in the Pennsylvania 
action that CoBon had not paid A&A their share of the proceeds received by CoBon from 
all of the synfuel plants because that had not happened. At the time the Pennsylvania action 
was terminated by the settlement, CoBon had not even received any proceeds to distribute 
under the Consulting Agreement. Indeed, CoBon had even advanced A&A a share of future 
"anticipated" proceeds. Not only had there been no breach of the Consulting Agreement to 
litigate in the Pennsylvania action, there was no hint that CoBon would breach this 
Agreement until two years after the settlement of the Pennsylvania action. 
CoBon argues the expressed subject matter did not mention the July 1,1998 agreement. 
Such a mention is not necessary to limit the release. What matters is that the expressed 
subject matter did not mention CoBon or the Consulting Agreement and was an exact 
description of only Viron's services to the operation of the Robena plant. 
CoBon also argues that A&A's interpretation allegedly is inconsistent with CoBon's 
inclusion as a "Released Party." However, CoBon's inclusion as a "Released Party" is 
consistent with limiting the release to claims relating to Viron's services to Robena, as 
CoBon was responsible for Robena's retention of Viron. 
CoBon's interpretation fails for the same reasons as CoBon5s critique of A&A's 
interpretation. CoBon somehow interprets the June 2000 Release as covering "at least" four 
different subject matters, each in addition to the expressed one. (Aplee. Br. at 18-19, 27-
25 
28,35-36.) According to CoBon, these four different scopes amount to a general release by 
A&A of all claims against CoBon. 
CoBon's interpretation plainly violates the Pennsylvania rule limiting application of 
releases to the scope that is expressly stated in the release. CoBon, like the trial court, 
incorrectly interprets the release broadly by inference and implication. However, 
Pennsylvania law requires the release be limited to its expressed subject matter - in this case, 
any and all claims relating to "any consulting services which have been performed by Viron 
regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." There is no mention of services that relate to 
Viron's services to CoBon in the development and sale of multiple plants. The release 
cannot be interpreted to add any other claims. 
IV. CoBon's Arguments In Addition To Its Interpretation And Theory Of Application 
Of The June 2000 Release To A&A's Claims Also Are Unavailing 
CoBon's extensive invocation of the parol evidence rule is misguided and contrary to 
its own argument. The parol evidence rule does not prevent consideration of the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of a release in order to determine the release's 
intended scope; indeed, a court is required to consider the circumstances to determine that 
intent. See Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 405-06 ("Under Pennsylvania law, [fjirst, a court 
must look to the language of the release Next, in determining the intent of the parties, 
a court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release."); see 
also Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40 ('"The courts of Pennsylvania have traditionally determined the 
effect of a release using the ordinary meaning of its language and interpreted the release as 
covering only such matters as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the 
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parties when the release was given."). The surrounding circumstances obviously are relevant 
to determine the "contemplation of the parties." See Huegel v. Mifflin Constr. Co., Inc., 796 
A.2d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 2002). This includes the parties' conduct after the release is 
entered into, such as CoBon's payments to A&A for their share of proceeds under the 
Consulting Agreement. See Sun Co., 708 A.2d at 880. Moreover, CoBon argues against 
itself, as CoBon's theory for application of the release to A&A's Claims rests upon extrinsic 
evidence regarding the April-May 1998 dispute and Viron's mistaken allegation in the 
Pennsylvania action that the May 8, 1998 letter was their contract with Robena. 
CoBon's related argument that the June 2000 Release is unambiguous also is 
misguided. A&A do not claim that the June 2000 Release is ambiguous. Indeed, as argued 
above, it is A&A's position that the release language unambiguously limits the release to the 
services of Viron "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" for which it was owed the 
precise settlement amount of $60,000. Nevertheless, the release does not need to be 
ambiguous in order for this Court to consider its circumstances, and the circumstances 
confirm the parties' intent to so limit the release. See Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 405-06; 
Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40; Cocker oft, 189 A. at 689. 
CoBon's arguments that the June 2000 Release is enforceable against A&A and that 
CoBon may enforce it (Aplee. Br. at 32-34) are irrelevant because A&A do not challenge the 
enforceability of the release. Instead, CoBon's allegation that the release bars A&A's Claims 
is against the rule that, as an intended third-party beneficiary, CoBon may enforce only the 
scope of release agreed to by Viron and Robena. CoBon's listing as a "Released Party" does 
27 
not add claims to the intended release beyond claims relating to Viron's services to Robena. 
CoBon has no answer to the fact that its interpretation would mean Robena had released 
claims against Palmer that plainly were not intended to be released. 
CoBon's argument regarding the doctrine of mistake (Aplee Br. at 50-54) is irrelevant. 
A&A do not claim that the June 2000 Release is unenforceable due to a mistake. Instead, 
A&A merely point out, in response to CoBon's reliance upon Viron's allegation in its 
Pennsylvania complaint that the May 8,1998 letter was their contract with Robena, that this 
allegation was a patent mistake. It was a patent mistake because it could not have been true. 
Viron was alleging a contract between only it and Robena. (Tab S.) A purported contract 
between only A&A and CoBon (the May 8, 1998 letter) could not have been a contract 
between only Viron and Robena. Contrary to CoBon's argument, Viron's verification of the 
allegation did not make it true. 
Viron's patent mistake stands in stark contrast to the Appellees' Briefs repeated 
assertion that CoBon's representations and actions were "mistakes" on CoBon's part. CoBon 
claims as mistakes (1) its representations (Tab U at 4) that the July 1, 1998 agreement was 
Viron's contract with Robena and that the May 18-19, 1998 letter of understanding, not the 
May 8, 1998 letter, had been the operative contract leading to Robena's retention of Viron, 
(2) its payments to A&A (Tabs Y at AA004282, BB at 1J49; 6548 at Ex. 1008), and (3) its 
July 2002 accounting (Tab Y), wherein CoBon acknowledged both its receipt of proceeds 
"for distribution" to A&A and its payments to A&A. (Aplee. Br. at n.18, n.46.) Plainly, 
CoBon calls these representations and actions "mistakes" merely because they are 
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inconveniently inconsistent with CoBon's allegation, raised years later, that the June 2000 
Release bars A&A's Claims. Moreover, CoBon's alleged reason for these alleged 
"mistakes" - that CoBon allegedly lacked sufficient information - rings false. CoBon, of 
course, identifies no information it allegedly lacked that made its representations and actions 
untrue; the evidence shows that the actions and representations were true. Moreover, what 
information could CoBon have lacked when CoBon was the source of all relevant knowledge 
regarding its representations and actions? CoBon was the party responsible for the May 18-
19, 1998 letter, Robena's retention of Viron, its payments and accounting to A&A, and 
manifestly knew of its receipt of distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. 
For the same reason, the Appellees' Brief s repeated assertions that CoBon's May 2000 
and November-December 2001 checks to A&A were not payments to A&A, and that the July 
1,1998 agreement was not subject of the Pennsylvania action because, if they had been, they 
would have been inconsistent with the alleged release by A&A of their claims to payment 
under the Consulting Agreement (Aplee. Br. at 48, n.46), are specious. As with CoBon's 
"mistake" assertions, these assertions are based upon the assumption that A&A released their 
claims to payment of a share of CoBon's proceeds pursuant to the Consulting Agreement. 
This, of course, cannot be assumed. The relevant question is whether CoBon's payments to 
A&A of eight checks totaling $438,000 between May 2000 and December 2001, which 
stated they were payments under the Consulting Agreement and which CoBon accounted as 
payments under the Consulting Agreement (Tab Y at AA004282; 6548 at Ex. 1008), are 
consistent with A&A's position that neither A&A nor CoBon thought the Pennsylvania 
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action and the settlement of that action had anything to do with CoBon's obligation to pay 
A&A under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon's present assertion that these payments were 
something other than payments rings untrue. 
CoBon's assertion that the payments, alternatively, were either further settlement 
payments or merely "loans" under Section 4.0 of the Consulting Agreement (Aplee. Br. at 
n. 18) serves only to further undermine CoBon's credibility. First, even if the payments were 
either settlement payments or Section 4.0 loans, the payments still would be contrary to 
CoBon's allegation that the June 2000 Release bars A&A's Claims. If A&A had completely 
released CoBon of all liability, then why would CoBon subsequently have made settlement 
payments or loans to A&A under the Consulting Agreement? The only answer is that the 
payments are "the strongest indication" that the June 2000 Release was not a release of 
A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement. See Sun Co., 708 A.2d at 880. 
Second, CoBon's assertions have no support in the record. No writing contemporaneous 
with the payments indicates they were loans or settlement payments. CoBon did not account 
for the payments as either settlement payments or loans. (Tabs Y, AA at f 95, BB at 1J1f49-
50.) There were no promissory notes as required under Section 4.0. (Tab BB at ^50.) The 
amount of the payments far exceeded the amount of loans CoBon was obligated to provide 
under Section 4.0. (Tab C at §4.0.) More importantly, CoBon told A&A they were payments 
under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab BB at f49.) 
CoBon's repeated references to the trial court's findings and conclusions in the March 
2010 Order as authoritative are misplaced. As CoBon concedes, this Court's determination 
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of whether the June 2000 Release bars A&A Claims is de novo without deference to the trial 
court, thus the trial court's findings and conclusions are not authoritative. See WebBank v. 
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,115, 54 P.3d 1139. Moreover, because 
the trial court disposed of A&A's Claims upon a grant of CoBon's motion for summary 
motion, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to A&A, the non-moving party. See 
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918,919 (Utah 1964). 
CoBon's assertions that it continued to own and control Robena after it sold Robena to 
Providian on June 26,1998, and references to "Robena/CoBon" as if they were one and the 
same, are contrary to the record. (Aplee. Br. at 13, 14-15, 45, n.30.) The contract for 
CoBon's sale of Robena, and Providian's filing with the IRS to obtain certification for the 
Robena plant, prove CoBon wrong. (6548 at Exs. 386, 470.) Also proving CoBon wrong 
are the following facts: (1) CoBon was removed as Robena's manager and replaced by 
Palmer in July 1999 at Providian's direction over CoBon's objection (Tabs M, L, AA at 
ffl[l 18-123; 6548 at Ex. 736), (2) CoBon was at odds with Robena regarding Robena's non-
payment of Viron (6548 at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; Tabs M-O, Q, T-V), (3) CoBon 
expressly stated that Robena's counsel for the Pennsylvania action did not represent CoBon 
(Tab U), (4) CoBon complained to Providian regarding its lack of authority over Robena 
after it had been removed as its manager (stating its position as the general partner was a 
"charade") (Tab T at pp.3-4), and (4) CoBon's counsel admitted Robena no longer was a 
subsidiary of CoBon after its sale to Providian (6457-6456). 
CoBon repeatedly mistakenly asserts Viron's consideration for their release was not 
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only payment of $60,000, but also payment of the $ 180,000 of previous payments by Robena 
to Viron. (Aplee. Br. at 2,46, n.18, n.45.) The June 2000 Release expressly stated Viron's 
consideration was only $60,000 (Tab B), and the previously-paid $ 180,000 of fees could not 
have been consideration for Viron's release as a matter of law. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 71 ("To constitute consideration, a performance... must be bargained for.") 
CoBon repeatedly misrepresents that A&A's principals testified that the June 2000 
Release was a release of A&A's Claims. (Aplee. Br. at 16-17, 49-50.) None of the 
testimony cited by CoBon regarded the language, circumstances or intended scope of the 
release so as to be relevant. Instead, CoBon cites testimony concerning the interrelationship 
of A&A's services regarding the separate projects to develop synfuel plants and the 
relationship of A&A's Claims to A&A's services under the Consulting Agreement. This 
testimony is irrelevant because it did not concern the intended scope of the release and the 
determination of that intended scope does not turn on whether A&A' s services to CoBon may 
have related to Viron's services to Robena. CoBon neither cites nor addresses the only 
testimony given by A&A's principals regarding the intended scope of the release, which was 
that no release of A&A's Claims was intended. (3392 at Ex. A.) 
CoBon's argument that A&A were "Viron" (Aplee. Br. at 31) is misguided. This is a 
conceded fact. What matters is that CoBon and Robena referred to A&A as "Viron" only 
in connection with Viron' s services to Robena and Robena's $ 15,000 monthly payments, and 
never regarding A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement and CoBon's 
duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement (e.g., Tabs W, X, Y), which is a fact that 
CoBon does not challenge. 
Finally, CoBon's assertion that it seeks $60 million in damages from A&A is 
inflammatory. CoBon's original or amended complaint made no such allegation and CoBon 
has never provided a Rule 26 disclosure supporting such a damage claim. In contrast, A&A 
have presented their $22 million damage claim in detail, with supporting evidence. (1810.) 
CoBon's assertion only serves to underscore the lack of merit of its position. See Wenger, 
226 A.2d at 654-55. 
CONCLUSION 
A&A urge this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
CoBon as to A&A's Claims and dismissal of A&A's ancillary claims, order the reinstatement 
of those claims, and remand the case for further proceedings on all claims. 
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